Many networks, particularly infrastructure networks, have multiple source nodes and multiple terminal nodes. And many such networks exhibit community structures, wherein the network is partitioned into groups of densely connected nodes with sparse connections between groups, based on topology or spatial characteristics, among others. This article proposes an approach for evaluating the effects of disruptive events, or the disconnection of network components due to failures or attacks, to the community structures and to the total network. The approach enables the assessment of resilience, evaluating both the vulnerability of the network and the recoverability enabled by different network restoration sequences. Different predefined restoration sequences are compared from different perspectives, including cost and strategy characteristics as well as resilience objectives (partial or complete restoration). The approach is illustrated with the topology of an electric power network.
Introduction
A community is a network structure consisting of a group of nodes that are ''relatively densely connected to each other but sparsely connected to other dense groups in the network.'' 1 Communities may form for a number of reasons, including spatial location, the topology of the network, or the characteristics of links in the network (e.g. capacities), among others. The existence of communities in networks can have broader ramifications, depending on the application (e.g. spreading of ideas or disease in a social network and attacking densely connected components in an infrastructure network).
In any network, the occurrence of a disruptive event that causes the disconnection of nodes, links, or both could affect the performance of the network. Network vulnerability, caused by the removal of network components, has been a well-studied topic. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] The performance of networks after component removal is often evaluated through a maximum source-terminal (s À t) flow algorithm (e.g. Nicholson et al. 8 offer vulnerability measures considering all node pairs average maximum flow). However, many networks, by their nature, have multiple source (or supply) nodes and multiple terminal (or demand) nodes. Characterizing networks as multisource, multi-terminal networks is useful in many applications, including transportation and utility networks. And many of these networks exhibit community structures as well. For multi-source, multi-terminal networks with community structures, it is possible to assess the effects that disconnections cause to the performance of each community (e.g. in an electric power network, the load shedding that occurs in each community could be evaluated). Similarly, the performance of the entire network could be evaluated (e.g. sources and terminals co-located in a particular community may become separated from the rest of the network).
Presidential Policy Directive 21 9 states that critical infrastructure ''must be secure and able to withstand and rapidly recover from all hazards,'' where the combination of ''withstanding'' and ''recovering'' from disruptions constitutes resilience. A vulnerability assessment measures the extent to which a network, as well as its community structures, can withstand a disruption. The next logical step is an assessment of the behavior of the network and its community structures during recovery. As such, the combination of vulnerability and recoverability assessments can produce a better understanding of the resilience of the network and its communities. This work proposes an approach to quantify the resilience of a multi-source, multi-terminal network and its community structures, as well as proposes an approach to evaluate restoration strategies. The contribution of this article is an approach proposed to (1) assess the effects of a disruption to the performance of each community and of the entire network and (2) evaluate a selected restoration sequence (or determine the best choice among a predefined set) to achieve a predefined restoration level based on how individual communities and/or the entire network are recovered.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: section ''Methodological background'' describes the main concepts associated with (1) network resilience; (2) multi-source, multi-terminal networks and their partitioning into communities; and (3) the evaluation of network performance. Section ''Proposed approach'' describes the approach proposed for assessing resilience, while section ''Illustrative example: resilience of community structures in electric power networks'' provides results of experimentation on an electric power network topology. Section ''Concluding remarks'' provides concluding remarks.
Methodological background
This section offers background on the approaches to quantify resilience and identify community structures in networks.
Modeling resilience
While several measures of resilience have recently been offered in the literature, a recent review of which is found in Hosseini et al., 10 this work makes use of a paradigm developed by Henry and Ramirez-Marquez, 14 as it describes a time-dependent measure of resilience based on a general performance function. Figure 1 depicts the performance of a system or network over time, measured with a function u(t).
11-13 Performance degrades after a disruption, shown in Figure 1 as a decrease in u(t) (e.g. when u(t) measures flow along a network). More detail about the states in Figure 1 , as well as the trajectory of u(t), can be found in Pant et al. 13 Of interest in this work are the vulnerability and recoverability dimensions of resilience. A measure of resilience, calculated as the time-dependent ratio of recovery to loss, is provided in equation (1) . Note that, generally, resilience takes on a value between 0 and 1 with a u (tje l ) = 1 implying a fully resilient network (i.e. flow having returned to its as-planned value)
This measure of resilience has been applied to the study of infrastructure systems [13] [14] [15] and component importance, 12 among others. Based on equation (1), Pant et al. 13 offered some additional measures of resilience: (1) time to complete restoration, or the total time spent from the point t s when recovery activities commence up to the time when all recovery activities are finalized; (2) time to full system resilience, or the time spent from t s up to the time when a u (tje l ) = 1 (note that for network applications, flow can be at its maximum when links are still disrupted, thus the distinction between (1) and (2)); and (3) time to a 3 100% resilience, or the time spent from t s up to when a u (tje l ) = a.
Communities in networks
When nodes with similar characteristics have close connections, they form a community, and the connections Figure 1 . Graphical depiction of the disruption and recovery of system performance, f(t), across several state transitions over time.
between communities are relatively sparse. Figure 2 offers an illustration of three communities: community A consists of {1, 2}, community B of {3, 4, 5}, and community C of {6, 7, 8, 9}. Community detection techniques can be used to identify the community structures that exist in networks, thus enabling an assessment of the vulnerability of the different communities. For example, it may be important to understand the set of nodes or links that, when disconnected, results in an island of one or more communities. That is, in Figure 2 , the inter-community links (ICLs) between communities A and C or between B and C could be considered important. Note that in this example links (5-6), (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) , (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) , and (2-7) defines the ICL. An initial qualitative exploration of the vulnerability of community structures appears in Rocco and Ramirez-Marquez. 16 Studies on community structures require the topology of the network and, in some applications, the weights of the links. In this work, the weights correspond to the flow on the link between two nodes prior to a disruption. Several approaches have been proposed in the literature to partition networks into communities, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] and these approaches are implemented in the R igraph 0.7.2 library that is used subsequently in the illustrative example. A survey of these and other recent approaches can be found in Fortunato. 25 Furthermore, community structures in infrastructure networks have been explored in Gomez et al. 26 and Lim et al. 27 Since the objective of this article in not to compare different approaches for community detection, the Fast Modularity algorithm 16 is selected to perform the network partition, as it is capable of considering weighted graphs. The algorithm is a procedure that uses the concept of modularity to guide a greedy process. The modularity is a measure for assessing the quality of a partition. Initially, each node represents a community. Then, the pair of communities i and j with the highest change in modularity is joined to create a new structure. The process is repeated until the change in modularity due to the possible communities to be joined is negative. 18 The complexity of the algorithm is O(nlog2n), being n the number of nodes in the network.
Network representation and performance
Let G(N, A, W) define a network where N represents the set of nodes, i 2 N, i = 1, . . . , n, and A represents the set of links,
the set of links, and A j j = m. w ij 2 W represents the set of capacities between two interconnected nodes i and j.
In this work, networks with multiple sources and/or multiple terminals are considered. Under the maximum flow approach, the network is modified as follows: (1) each source node has a capacity and each terminal node has a load; (2) all of the source nodes are connected to a supersource node s, and the maximum capacity of the arc between node s and any capacity node g is set to the net capacity of node g; and (3) all of the terminal nodes are connected to the superterminal node t, and the maximum capacity between a terminal node r and t is set to the net load of node r.
A similar approach of defining supernodes (supersource and superterminal nodes) has been used in other areas, including bridge transportation networks 28, 29 or financial networks. 30 For example, in Lee et al., 28 the authors make use of subjunctive nodes and links, while in Nagurney and Siokos, 30 the authors define supernodes of funds.
The total load that can be supplied by the network is equivalent to the maximum flow between s and t (maximum s À t flow). The maximum s À t flow is a well-known problem in network optimization that consists in determining the maximum feasible flow that a capacitated network is able to transport from a source node (s) to a terminal (t) node. The commonly used Ford-Fulkerson 31 method is used to determine the maximum s À t flow. However, in this article, the maximum s À t flow is evaluated using the procedure graph.flow implemented in the igraph 0.7.2 library in the R environment, able to consider directed as well undirected network with no additional network transformation by the user.
The detection of communities in a multi-source, multi-terminal network allows the quantification of (1) the total load supplied in each community, (2) the total load supplied in the network, as well as (3) the flows between communities (i.e. the flow through the ICL). Several disconnection scenarios could be analyzed, including events that only affect a subset of ICL, a subset of non-ICL, or any of the links in the network. All three of these scenarios are studied subsequently. In Figure 2 . An example partition of communities in a network. 16 any case, the selected disruption scenario could cause a variation of the flow in the network, where the total load in each community or in the network could be affected and produce a load shedding at the community or network level. The approach proposed in this article is able to quantify such load shedding and assess restoration strategies.
Proposed approach
The proposed approach for measuring the resilience of community structures is discussed in this section.
Notation for disruptions
For network G(N, A, W), let F 0 represent the set of initial flows defined for each link in A, determined using the flow results derived by evaluating the maximum s À t flow in the network with capacities W. Let P 0 be the initial partition, or the initial group of communities, of the network derived using F 0 . Let C k , k = 1, . . . , K, represent the kth community in the network with
represent the initial total load supplied to community k and L 0, sys be the initial total load supplied in the network. These are the performance measures of the individual communities and the overall network for which behavior can be studied before a disruption as in Figure 1 and to which post-disruption performance can be compared. That is, given the notation in equation (1), u k (t 0 ) = L 0k and u sys (t 0 ) = L 0, sys are the pre-disruption baseline performances. When disruptive event e l occurs, a set of links, D l , are disconnected, and the corresponding capacities in W are set to 0, representing no flow allowed along the disconnected links. Let W l represent the new set of capacities found after the disconnection of links D l . While it is assumed here that links are either at full capacity or at no capacity, a straightforward adjustment would allow for proportional postdisruption capacities.
It is assumed that event e l causes the simultaneous disconnections of all of the links in D l . In this case, the new maximum s À t flow will determine the total load supplied to each community, L lk , and the total load supplied in the system, L l, sys . That is, u k (t d je l ) = L lk and u sys (t d je l ) = L l, sys in the notation of equation (1). The load shedding in each community and in the network can be determined by comparing L lk with L 0k and L l, sys with L 0, sys , respectively, as the difference in pre-disruption and post-disruption values. Load shedding for community k is then LS lk = L 0k À L lk and for the overall network is LS l, sys = L 0, sys À L l, sys . Note that other approaches could be used to calculate load shedding. 32 Each of the disrupted links in D l has its own restoration time; therefore, let T l be the jD l j 3 1 vector of restoration times for each of the links in D l . Let SR l be the jD l j 3 1 vector listing the sequence of the links to be restored. And as a result, let TR l be the jD l j 3 1 vector containing the points in time at which each link restoration has completed, which depends on the restoration strategy selected (e.g. in series, all at once). As the links are restored, the new loads supplied for each community and system are evaluated. u k (tje l ) and u sys (tje l ) represent the community and network level load, respectively, over time as links are recovered according to the recovery strategy.
As 33 and evolutionary strategies 34, 35 ). Given that load shedding in each community could have different monetary impacts, the restoration process could consider different cost functions, Cost k (t). 32 
Assessment of link vulnerability and recoverability
The proposed approach is presented in the form of step-by-step procedures that result in (1) the calculation of community and network vulnerability measures via load supplied and load shedding, in the form of procedure Vulnerability Assessment, and (2) the calculation of community and network recoverability using procedure Recoverability Assessment.
A plot of u k (tje l ) and u sys (tje l ) versus the elements of TR l illustrates the evolution of the performance function during the restoration process corresponding to the given set of links disconnected D l (thus a specific form of Figure 1 for strategy SR l ).
The procedure Vulnerability Assessment could be repeated NT times to evaluate NT different disruptive events and to determine, for example, the worst disruptive event among them (e.g. the event that produces the maximum system load shedding). Recoverability Assessment could be repeated NT 1 times to evaluate different restoration schemes for a given disruptive event and to select the best restoration scheme that, for example, minimizes the total cost. For example, the procedure Best Recovery selects, among the NT 1 restoration schemes to be evaluated, the one that minimizes the total economic impact of the load shedding and guarantee that all of the communities reach the a 3 100% level in the shortest amount of time.
Illustrative example: resilience of community structures in electric power networks
The Italian high-voltage (380 kV) electrical transmission network is represented in Figure 3 by an undirected graph of 310 nodes and 361 lines. 36 The network, which has 113 source (generation) nodes and 101 terminal (load) nodes, has been analyzed from a topological perspective 37 and more extensively in Rosato et al. 36 The latter work illustrates the results of a vulnerability analysis based on a ''dynamical model of the network, by reproducing the power flow conditions.'' As the network is composed of several generation units and several load points, it is modeled as a multiple source, multiple terminal network. To illustrate the proposed approach, the electrical behavior of the power flows is simplified by evaluating the maximum flow in the network. [38] [39] [40] However, the use of a detailed flow model (e.g. running an AC power flow method to mimic the behavior of electric power) is possible by simply changing the references to the maximum flow procedure in the approach presented. Of course, additional data regarding power components and generators would be required in the deployment of such a method.
Other assumptions are as follows:
The network topology is free of error. Network component characteristics are known. Community detection is performed using the Fast Modularity algorithm; 16 the maximum flow problem is solved using the procedure graph.flow, both available in the R igraph 0.7.2 library. The load of each community is splittable (i.e. partial load shedding is allowed). The links that define the disruptive event are all disconnected at the same time. A constant monetary restoration cost in each community cost k (t) = cost k is considered; however, no maintenance costs are considered. Restoration actions commence at time t s = 0. Restoration is performed in series. However, if the times to start the restoration of two or more links are equal, then the restoration actions are performed simultaneously. The time to restoration for each link were randomly generated from a discrete uniform distribution, UNI 5, 17 (though any other distribution could be used). Links to and from supernodes are not affected by a disruptive event. Only a subset of possible permutations of a selected D l is evaluated to find the best restoration sequence. That is, optimization is not performed on all of the D l j j! possible sequences, but a best solution is found from the simulated set.
For this case, the maximum s À t flow is 23,376 units. Figure 4 depicts the set of 17 communities detected (nodes belonging to a community have the same color). There are 42 ICLs represented in red. Figure 5 reduces the initial community structure, illustrating the communities as nodes connected by the ICLs, whose sizes are proportional to their flows. Figure 6 displays the total load and generation per community, where the load in community k is L 0k . As can be observed, some communities do not require any load shedding when a disruption causes their islanding, as generation is greater than load (e.g. communities 12 and 13).
Community characteristics

Analysis of disruptions
To illustrate the effects of disruptive events, NT = 1000 random events of D l j j= 10 disrupted links were generated and then evaluated using the procedure Vulnerability Assessment. Three disruptive scenarios were considered: (1) only links within ICLs were disrupted, (2) only non-ICLs were disrupted, and (3) any of the links were disrupted. In each of the scenarios considered, links were randomly selected from the corresponding set of links and disconnected from the network. For example, in scenario (1), a sample of D l j j= 10 links are randomly selected out of the 42 ICLs (i.e. the red links shown in Figure 4) , and their capacity is fixed to zero. This defines a sample of a disruptive event. Figure 7 depicts the community load variation for each scenario. Box plots depict the load behavior for each of the communities after disruption, across the simulations (the continuous lines represent L 0k for each community). Figure 8 represents the load behavior (scaled to [0, 1]) during the sampling process. Comparing Figures 7 and 8 , it is clear that some communities are not affected in specific scenarios. For example, in Figure 7 (1), the box plot associated with community 1 collapses to the base load, while Figure  8 (1) shows that its load remains fixed during the sampling process. In general, from Figures 7 and 8, the smallest variation occurs for scenario (1), since only events related to ICL are evaluated (thus not affecting structures within communities). Note that, a priori, it could be difficult to determine how a disruption could affect the system, and in particular, each community. The effects on a specific area could depend of many operational factors, such as the number of simultaneously links failed, the load in each link prior to the disruption, if partial load shedding is allowed, the internal structure (i.e. how nodes in a community are linked), and the generation and load locations, among other factors. In a real system, additional nonlinear relations exist (e.g. between flow and voltage) that could cause additional constraints. However, these figures allow for a clear synthesis of the effects in the communities. 
Analysis of recovery
To illustrate the use of the restoration procedure, the disruptive event that produces the maximum load shedding is selected. The event is extracted from the set of events generated in scenario (3), and it is composed of links 20, 47, 340, 191, 28, 133, 6 , 161, 310g. The cost associated with link restoration in each community is static, Cost k (t) = Cost k = 1.
As assumed for illustrative purposes, the time to restoration for each link was randomly generated from a discrete uniform distribution, UNI. 5, 17 In addition, NT 1 = 1000 random different permutations were generated, and the best sequence among them was selected using the procedure Best Recovery. We illustrate three different examples of recovery decision making in the following subsections.
Emphasizing cost. Figure 9 shows the restoration sequence SR 98 = (6, 191, 28, 133, 161, 91, 47, 310, 340, 20) T that minimizes the total cost for the communities that are affected, as well as the cost for the system. The vertical axis represents the percentage of load, and the trajectory of load restoration is shown over TR 98 = (0, 10, 22, 22, 39, 52, 61, 74, 81, 86, 94) T . At t = 94, all of the communities achieve 100% resilience. The final cost is 109,798 units.
Consider, for example, community 3 (represented with yellow crosses in Figure 9 ). After the disruptive event, the load in this community was near 59% of its baseline level. The load remains at this level even if some links of the sequence are restored (links 6, 191, and 28) at time t = 10 and t = 22, respectively (note that at time t = 22, both links 191 and 28 are restored). This suggests that the restoration of these links does not affect the restoration of community 3. At time t = 39 (restoration of link 133), the load jumps up to almost 80%. Finally, at time t = 86, the community is fully restored.
From Figure 9 , it is clear that the restoration behavior of the communities is different and that the restoration of the links can impact communities differently. Figure 9 also shows the behavior of the restoration process associated with the total network load. At t = 0, the total load supplied is almost 82%. Note that at time t = 39, all of the communities are restored to at least 70% of baseline performance. However, it possible that SR 98 is not the best sequence to achieve a faster restoration for that level.
Emphasizing resilience. When the choice of recovery strategy is based not on the cost of achieving full resilience but on the time to 70% resilience, the sequence changes, as shown in Figure 10 . In this case, the best sequence is SR 98 = (310, 20, 191, 340, 161, 6, 47, 28, 91, 133) T , with TR 98 = (0, 7, 15, 27, 32, 45, 55, 68, 80, 89, 106) T . Note that at t = 27, all of the communities achieve the 70% level of resilience, and the network reaches an approximate value of 92%. However, the system is fully restored at time t = 106, and the final cost is 163,450 units (almost 50% more expensive). As such, there exists a trade-off between restoration cost and achieving a particular performance level more quickly, a trade-off that decision makers would seemingly need to make. Figure 11 compares the behavior of system restoration for a = 0:7 and a = 1. The ticks in the time axis represent the time at which a restoration activity occurs. Note that at specific times, the behavior of the restoration sequence for 70% resilience is faster than the 100% behavior. However, the total area under the 70% curve is less than the area under the 100% curve, suggesting that the total recoverability for 70% is slower. Figure 12 depicts the behavior of three selected restoration sequences: (1) the sequence with minimum cost, (2) the sequence leading to the maximum cost, and (3) the sequence that achieves the 100% level most quickly. The corresponding costs are 109,798, 283,862, and 120,760, respectively. Note that the quickest sequence achieves the 100% level at time t = 81, while the minimum cost sequence achieves the fully restored state at t = 94.
Emphasizing alternative cost structures. To evaluate the effects of different costs, the cost associated with communities 2 and 3, cost 2 (t) and cost 3 (t), are fixed to 10 units. Figure 13 illustrates the best restoration sequence corresponding to SR 98 = (310, 133, 340, 47, 161, 28, 91, 191, 6, 20) T and TR 98 = (0, 7, 24, 29, 42, 42, 54, 63, 75, 85, 93)
T . Note that in this case, the system is fully restored at time t = 93 with a cost of 1,768,987 (almost 16% more than the previous evaluation).
Concluding remarks
Multi-source, multi-terminal networks are widely found in a variety of applications. And these networks often display community structures, where some groups of nodes have close connections with each other and the connections between groups are relatively sparse. This article proposes an approach to study the vulnerability (the impact to the performance at the community level Figure 11 . Comparison of the recovery trajectories for strategies designed to minimize cost to 100% resilience and design to achieve 70% resilience most quickly. Figure 9 . The restoration of load to 100% for several communities (2, 3, 6, 7, 15, 16) and the network (sys) using best restoration sequence SR 98 . Figure 10 . The restoration of load for several communities (2, 3, 6, 7, 15, 16) and the network (sys) using the restoration sequence designed to achieve 70% resilience most quickly.
or the whole network) and evaluate recoverability (the restoration of performance of the network and communities) strategies to achieve a predefined partial or total restoration (at community or whole network), under different objectives, such as minimizing the restoration cost or minimizing the restoration time. Network performance is measured as the load flowing in the community and total network, evaluated with a maximum s À t flow procedure, though any other performance function could be used (e.g. a black box model) thus making the approach general.
The approach was applied to the study of community structures in a multi-source, multi-terminal electric power network, using the maximum flow procedure as a proxy for the load curtailed during a disruption.
However, a detailed flow model (e.g. an AC power flow model) could be used with little manipulation of the procedure when data regarding power components and generators are known. Examples of the use of the proposed procedures for assessing the effects of disruptions or the selection of the appropriate restoration sequence were considered using a reduced set of selected alternatives.
Results show interesting behaviors that at first glance were not evident: (1) the type of components disrupted (i.e. ICL vs non-ICL) produces a different effect on each community (e.g. ICL disconnection impacts load shedding in communities less), (2) communities are not equally affected by disruptions, (3) the performance of the communities during restoration differs depending on the restoration strategy or the order of the components restored, and (4) the trajectory of community performance during restoration depends on the objective of recovery (e.g. minimal cost vs time to achieve a defined resilience level; 70%). Although not considered in the example, the results of the network analyzed suggest that the restoration analysis could also be evaluated by defining objectives for a specific community or group of communities. This means that the proposed approach could be a valuable tool to a decision maker for analyzing different scenarios.
Future work could be performed to extend the proposed approach in several directions: (1) the use of a biobjective model could be incorporated to evaluate the set of disconnected elements, with a predefined cardinality that maximizes the community load shedding, and to identify the best restoration sequence for each disruptive event; (2) a restoration sequence robust to many kinds of disruptive events could be also suggested; and (3) the development of an effective heuristic to derive proxy solutions for the best restoration sequence when the cardinality of the set of alternatives is high.
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